Understanding students' difficulties in terms of coupled epistemological
  and affective dynamics by Gupta, Ayush et al.
In Review 
/10/$25.00 ©2010 IEEE  October 27 - 30, 2010, Washington, DC 
 40th ASEE/IEEE Frontiers in Education Conference 
 (In Review) 
Understanding students’ difficulties in terms of 
coupled epistemological and affective dynamics 
 
Ayush Gupta, Brian A. Danielak, Andrew Elby 
University of Maryland, College Park, ayush@umd.edu, briandk@umd.edu, elby@umd.edu 
 
 
Abstract - An established body of literature shows that a 
student’s affect can be linked to her epistemological 
stance [1]. In this literature, the epistemology is 
generally taken as a belief or stance toward a discipline, 
and the affective stance applies broadly to a discipline or 
classroom culture. A second, emerging line of research, 
however, shows that a student in a given discipline can 
shift between multiple locally coherent epistemological 
stances [2]. To begin uniting these two bodies of 
literature, toward the long-term goal of incorporating 
affect into fine-grained models of in-the-moment 
cognitive dynamics, we present a case study of “Judy”, 
an undergraduate engineering major. We argue that a 
fine-grained aspect of Judy’s affect, her annoyance at a 
particular kind of homework problem, stabilizes a 
context-dependent epistemological stance she displays, 
about an unbridgeable gulf she perceives to exist 
between real and ideal circuits. 
Index Terms – Affect, Case Study, Cognitive Models, 
Epistemology, Qualitative Research. 
INTRODUCTION 
As instructors, educators, and education researchers, 
intuitively we know that students’ emotions, motivations, 
and sense of identity can strongly influence their behaviors 
in science learning environments. Research in cognitive 
science makes a persuasive case for the role that affect and 
identity play in regulating performance on cognitive tasks 
[3-7]. Nonetheless, explicitly incorporating emotion and 
identity into theories of science learning, though recognized 
as important, has proved to be a challenge [8-11].  
Cognitivist accounts of student reasoning and conceptual 
change in science [12-16] often pay little attention to the 
role of affect and identity in the use of knowledge by 
learners. On the other hand, accounts of learning and 
conceptual change that have paid greater attention to 
learners’ affect, social interaction, and the development of 
identity associated with the learning process [9],[17-20] 
often treat those subjects at a coarse grain size. They 
typically attend to students’ stances towards a subject as a 
whole or their aggregate emotions towards particular styles 
of learning. For example, a student’s negative emotional 
reaction towards a traditional, authoritarian classroom 
environment, and her sense of identity as someone who 
likes multiple interpretations can distance her from the 
subject of mathematics itself [17]. It is intuitively appealing, 
however, that students’ emotional states and aspects of their 
emerging disciplinary identity play a role not only in 
shaping their choices and beliefs, but in stabilizing or 
destabilizing their reasoning on a moment-to-moment basis. 
In this paper, using a case study of an undergraduate 
engineering student, we aim to support the intuitively 
plausible fine-grained connection between affective and 
epistemological stances. 
In two independent lines of research, researchers have 
started to build fine-grained models of learners’ affect and 
personal epistemologies. Hammer and Elby [21] extended 
the ideas of society of mind [22] and fine-grained elements 
of conceptual reasoning [12] to fine-grained epistemological 
elements that activate in different combinations to constitute 
an individual’s stance towards the nature and form of 
knowledge they are engaging with in a given moment. 
These stances are contextually activated, though coherent 
‘belief-like’ patterns of association can emerge over time 
[21]. 
Education research, especially in mathematics, has also 
started to pay attention to affect by describing its main 
components as beliefs, attitudes, emotions, [8] and values 
[23],[24]. Researchers aiming at fine-grained models of 
learners’ affect have approached it from a variety of 
perspectives: socio-cultural [25], positioning analysis [26] 
and as a cognitive representational system [27]. 
These fine-grained models of affect and epistemology, 
while not incompatible with one another, have remained 
separate. As such, connections between affect and 
epistemology have been limited to explorations at coarse-
grained scales, as discussed above [1],[9],[17]. The need to 
integrate the emotional, epistemological, and conceptual 
aspects of cognition at a fine-grained-level is recognized as 
important but under-emphasized [4],[8],[11].  
In this paper, we use a case study of an undergraduate 
engineering major to argue for the feasibility and 
explanatory power of integrating epistemological and 
affective elements into fine-grained models of cognitive 
dynamics. In some contexts, “Judy” argues that there is a 
wide gulf between real circuits and ideal circuits, a gulf that 
renders qualitative understanding of ideal circuits practically 
useless. We will argue that an affective stance, Judy’s deep 
annoyance at qualitative, conceptual homework problems, 
stabilizes her epistemological stance.  Disrupting the 
annoyance disrupts the epistemological stance. 
This argument has instructional implications. If a 
learners’ emotional stance plays a significant role in 
sustaining her epistemological stance, as we argue is the 
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case with Judy, then targeting her epistemological stance 
directly [28] might not be as productive as addressing the 
affective stance that sustains the epistemological stance.  
In the following section, we present the methods of our 
case study. We then present the patterns we found in Judy’s 
epistemological and emotional stances. Finally, we make the 
case that a fine-grained account of Judy’s reasoning is 
empirically inadequate without affective elements that lend 
stability to her epistemological stances. The argument relies 
on competing toy models of Judy’s cognitive dynamics, one 
of which includes affect and the other of which does not. In 
closing, we discuss the instructional implications of our 
analysis. 
DATA AND METHODS 
We videotaped clinical interviews of electrical engineering 
majors in a Basic Circuits course at a Large Public 
University. The course homework and exams mixed 
“traditional” quantitative problems with conceptual 
questions asking students to interpret equations and/or 
explain physical processes (rather than plugging and 
chugging).  These conceptual problems were co-created by 
the course instructor and two of the authors (AG, AE). One 
of us (BD) conducted one-hour semi-structured interviews 
with Judy and with 3 other students to explore their 
approaches to mathematics within, and their views and 
feelings about, the course. Interview participants were paid 
ten dollars.  
Working as a group, we looked for epistemological and 
affective patterns in participants’ responses, both within and 
across subjects, borrowing tools from discourse analysis 
[29], framing analysis [30], and affective analysis [25] to 
interpret gestures, facial expressions, word choice, and the 
contextualized substance of their utterances. In this paper, 
we present our analysis of one of our participants, Judy – a 
second year Electrical Engineering and Physics major. We 
formed explanations for her reasoning and behaviors and 
then looked for evidence elsewhere in the data to confirm or 
disconfirm the validity of these patterns [31],[32]. Working 
from a knowledge-in-pieces perspective [12],[33], we did 
not expect global coherence in all aspects of her thinking; 
we continually considered how specific contextual cues 
might trigger different local coherences in her thinking 
[2],[12],[28].  
CASE STUDY: PATTERNS IN JUDY’S BEHAVIOR 
In this section, we illustrate four patterns in Judy’s 
reasoning and behavior about circuits: 
1. Judy is annoyed by the conceptual questions  
2. Judy views conceptual reasoning as unproductive to her 
learning 
3. Judy sees a gulf between real-world circuits and the 
ideal circuits probed by the conceptual questions 
4. When discussing equations, Judy displays no 
annoyance and does not discuss the real/ideal gulf from 
Pattern #3 
At the first glance, it seems reasonable to explain 
Judy’s behavior in terms of her epistemological stance 
(about the disconnect between real and ideal circuits) 
driving her view that conceptual reasoning about ideal 
circuits is unproductive.  In such an account, her annoyance 
is a by-product that doesn’t contribute additional 
explanatory power.  Analysis of the entire interview, 
however, shows the greater explanatory power of a model in 
which Judy’s annoyance plays a key role in mediating the 
connection between her epistemological stance about real 
vs. ideal circuits and her view that conceptual reasoning is 
unproductive  
(1) Annoyance at conceptual problems:  
Judy, like other students we interviewed, distinguishes 
between the regular, mathematical problems and the more 
conceptual problems on the homework: 
 
[15:33] Interviewer: A student whose opinion I heard 
earlier from your class had noticed that the homework 
and tests seemed to contain two sort of types of 
questions—two different kinds of questions. And I was 
wondering if it’s been your experience that you’ve 
noticed something like that. 
 
 [16:01] Judy: Oh. I think, um, you mean two parts, 
right? Umm, I think one of them is like, um, just 
problem-solving. Like, you have a diagram {spreads 
hands out, gently taps table with fingertips} and then 
you solve for the current or voltage. Um, and the other 
type is like {shakes head gently side-to-side} a physical 
question. They will ask you what is {shakes head} 
physically {pinches thumb and forefingers of both 
hands together, moving her hands up and down} 
happening in the circuit, and you have to explain them 
in {shakes head slightly, left to right} words. 
 
Though our attempts to transcribe gestures cannot fully 
capture the annoyance Judy displays when discussing the 
“physical question[s],” we believe it was strongly present 
here and elsewhere in the interview. During one exchange, 
Judy explicitly labels these questions as “annoying”: 
 
[17:13] Judy: Yeah. I mean those questions are—it’s 
{shakes head gently, but repeatedly} kind of annoying. 
But it’s good to know {rise in voice tone}. 
 
Judy’s annoyance is coupled to another pattern in her 
reasoning: seeing conceptual reasoning as unproductive. 
(2) Judy views conceptual reasoning as unproductive:  
Judy sees conceptual reasoning as useless for practical 
purposes and considers equation-based problem-solving as 
“more helpful” and “more important”: 
 
[19:22] Interviewer: Do you think one kind of question 
is more helpful to you than the other kind? 
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[19:28] Judy: Umm, yeah I think the {cocks head, 
smiles} problem-solving is more helpful {laughs} and 
{nods} more important. 
  
And, when the interviewer asks about the importance of 
“physical” questions to a professional engineer (as opposed 
to an engineering student), Judy feels those questions have 
little bearing on what engineers actually do: 
 
[18:50] Judy: {shakes head gently, but repeatedly, left-
to-right} those physical questions are not very related 
to the actual world; not related {knits brow} to [a 
professional engineer’s] job. So...that’s why I say it’s 
not very necessary for student[s] who are only in EE 
major to learn those parts. (emphasis added) 
 
(3) Real/ideal gulf:  
Early in the interview, the interviewer asks Judy to imagine 
a female professional engineer who is taking a basic circuits 
course to reinforce her understanding of circuits, in 
preparation for a new job assignment.  Specifically, the 
interviewer asks what a perfect version of the circuits course 
would look like for that engineer. 
 
[05:16] Judy: Well, I think, um, the course should talk 
more about, um, how the actual world works. Because, 
sometimes we talk about, like, ideal circuits and, um 
theoretical methods. Those are not related to the actual 
circuit and those kind of things. So if the professor can 
talk a little bit more about the actual circuit and how 
those work, then it may be better for her. (emphasis 
added) 
 
[05:55] Interviewer: Why is that difference important to 
you? 
 
[05:57] Judy: Um, Because the ideal world is different. 
 
Elsewhere, Judy and the interviewer clarify that the 
phrase “theoretical methods”, to Judy, refers to conceptual, 
non-mathematical reasoning. Here and elsewhere, Judy 
expresses the view that the “real world” of circuits operates 
much differently from the “ideal circuits” she has learned 
about in class; the second is not a close approximation of 
the first. As a result, the class’s conceptual focus on ideal 
circuits is a poor use of class time:  
 
[06:13] Judy: Um, and, sometimes [in class] we talk 
about, um, the physical aspects of the circuits. Um, but 
I feel like when you really work on circuits it’s—it’s not 
very important. I mean, it’s better to know what 
happened physically, but if those are not ideal circuits, 
then it’s different. (emphasis added) 
 
This unbridgeable gulf between ideal and real circuits, 
she says, is what makes the conceptual problems annoying; 
those problems call for students to use concepts that apply 
only to ideal circuits: 
 
[08:53] Judy: Um, like a capacitor, I might say this 
wrong, but um, like they have a limit that how many 
currents, or how many electrons can stay on the plate. 
That’s a real world capacitor. But, for, ideally, 
sometimes in the course we assume that each plate can 
have infinite amount of electrons, and those kind of 
things. So, I mean, if that doesn’t exist then why do we 
use that method to solve it? We are not gonna use that 
method in the future anyway. (emphasis added) 
 
Later in the interview, Judy says that she expects later, 
more advanced course will teach her new ways of thinking 
about circuits that apply to real circuits and that are totally 
different from what she is learning in her present class. 
Crucially, despite her strong views about the real/ideal gulf 
Judy’s use of mathematics led us to our fourth observed 
pattern. 
(4) Non-activation of the real/ideal gulf during traditional 
problem-solving.  
Later in the interview, the interviewer shows Judy a simple 
DC circuit (figure 1) where the potential at a point a 
distance  along the “fat resistive” wire is given by V = (V0 
– ρI): 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
THE CIRCUIT FOR THE “FAT RESISTIVE WIRE” PROMPT 
 
[27:28] Interviewer: The question is, um, how would 
you explain this equation to a friend from class? 
 
[27:35] Judy: Um, first I would just, um, repeat this 
equation, and then explain what rho is, what I is, what L 
is. And then, um, I guess rho I and L is somewhat 
related to the resistance of the wire. So, I will explain 
that to him. And then, this is—yeah, I guess rho and L 
is kind of proportional to R. This question is basically 
just, uh, like uh, I equals V over R. Something like that. 
It’s actually a lot more easier question than it looks like. 
{smiles} Yeah. (emphasis added) 
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… 
[28:37] Interviewer: How did you know that um, rho 
and L were related to resistance? 
  
[28:41] Judy: Um, because I learned that before 
{smiles}. And, it looks like, also looks like kind of 
proportional to the, um, V. Yeah, so. I have a feeling 
{laughs}. 
 
When talking about or engaging in equation-based 
problem solving, Judy displays positive affect (she smiles 
and laughs and does not appear to be tensed), and we find 
no evidence that in these moments she is ever thinking 
about the real/ideal gulf (pattern#3). This is striking given 
that the equations she uses encode the same idealizing 
assumptions she disparages elsewhere in the interview. 
Earlier, though, it was Judy—not the interviewer—who 
brought up the real/ideal gulf when discussing conceptual 
questions. Her epistemological view about the real/ideal 
gulf is thus context-dependent: present when she discusses 
conceptual problems, but absent in both her discussions of 
and solutions to traditional ones.”. 
MODELING JUDY’S REASONING AND BEHAVIOR: AFFECT 
MEDIATED EPISTEMOLOGICAL DYNAMICS 
Judy’s epistemological stance about the real/ideal gulf is 
context dependent 
First, we argue that Judy’s epistemological stance about the 
real/ideal gulf is indeed context dependent, i.e. that 
sometimes it is “on,” playing an important role in her 
thinking, while at other times it is “off,” allowing her to 
think in ways that are at odds with that stance. Pattern #2 
and #3 suggest that, at least when thinking about the 
conceptual problems, Judy takes the stance that ideal 
circuits are so different from real ones as to render pointless 
thinking about ideal circuits. In pattern #4, by contrast, Judy 
does not exhibit this stance. We’re not claiming that Judy 
takes an opposing epistemological stance when thinking 
about mathematical problem-solving. Rather, we’re 
claiming that when she’s focused on mathematical problem-
solving the issue of a possible real/ideal gulf isn’t part of her 
thinking. The four patterns discussed above are consistent 
with a context-dependent but affect-free toy model (figure 
2) in which Judy’s epistemological view about the gulf 
between real and ideal circuits reinforces and is reinforced 
by her sense that the conceptual problems are useless. Note 
that this is a toy model, leaving out the vast majority of 
cognitive elements needed to model her cognition. The 
arrows represent excitatory links between nodes. The nodes 
in our model correspond to cognitive elements which can be 
at various grain-sizes [2],[28]. Specifically, in this model in 
figure 2, the nodes are epistemological.  Judy’s annoyance 
in this model would be peripheral to her epistemology. 
However, in the next subsection, we argue how such an 
affect-free model is insufficient to model Judy’s cognition. 
 
FIGURE 2 
“TOY” COGNITIVE MODEL FOR JUDY’S EPISTEMOLOGICAL STANCES – NOT 
INCORPORATING AFFECT 
 
Judy’s annoyance stabilizes her epistemological stance 
about the real/ideal gulf 
Two other episodes from the interview emphasize the need 
to incorporate affect into the cognitive toy model of Judy’s 
reasoning. 
 
Disconfirmatory Episode A: At the close of the interview, 
the interviewer asks Judy one of the conceptual homework 
questions from her course. 
 
[50:06] Interviewer: Suppose you were comparing, um, 
three different types of waves in a circuit. So, you’re 
comparing a sine wave, a square wave, and a triangle 
wave. And all three of them have the same RMS 
voltage. Which one has the highest peak voltage? 
 
[50:36] Judy: {sighs, smiles} Um, triangle wave. 
 
[50:39] Interviewer: OK. How do you know? 
 
Judy responds by summarizing what she remembered 
of her TA’s explanation, acknowledges that she can’t 
remember it fully, and turns to an equation. She talks about 
how the answer has something to do with the integral, 
which is “related to” the area under the curve. The 
interviewer then presses her to think it through for herself. 
In response, she does some excellent informal reasoning: 
 
[52:58] Interviewer: So, if you didn’t have your book, 
but you know there was some relationship between the 
integral and the area. Is there a way that you could think 
through this? 
 
[53:07] Judy: Um. {6 second pause} I guess—I mean I 
can try. So they have the same period like from, uh zero 
to T. So the integral would be like from zero to t. Um, 
and then they have some kind of wave form here. And 
they have a same answer. So. {5 second pause} I 
dunno. I mean, if they have the same area, um and, this 
part is like the same length, um, because like. This 
looks like wider {spreads hands apart, past her 
shoulders}—like the area looks wider {spreads hands 
again}. So there should be, like. If you squeeze it into 
{presses palms toward each other} this form, it should 
be like, going up {forms a peak with her hands}. So, it 
should be like this. So, apparently, like, they have a 
higher peak. 
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Judy here is thinking of the area under the curve as a 
kind of squeezable stuff; since the area under the three 
curves is the same, the amount of stuff is the same, and 
when you “squeeze” a rectangle (square wave) into a 
triangle (triangle wave) of the same base length, the triangle 
ends up with a “higher peak.” 
 
[54:42] Interviewer: But I’m interested in that you said 
“squeezing.” Do you ever  
 
Judy:{Judy laughs} no no no,  
 
Interviewer: do you ever um, ever um think about the 
mathematics that you use in that way? 
 
[54:53] Judy: No, I never think of that before. That’s 
the way how the—my TA told me. Yeah, I mean it’s I 
feel like it’s not very formal {smiles}, but it’s very 
useful.  
 
Our transcript does not capture the satisfaction—
evident in the video—she felt about her solution. Though 
Judy says of her solution, “it’s not very formal”—it’s the 
kind of qualitative reasoning she earlier labeled 
unproductive—in this moment, feeling good about her 
solution, she calls this kind of conceptual reasoning “very 
useful.”  The toy model in figure 2 doesn’t predict such a 
reversal of her epistemological stance: if annoyance didn’t 
mediate the link between the other two elements, then her 
positive experience should not have changed her view 
(ephemerally or otherwise) about the uselessness of 
conceptual reasoning. 
 
Disconfirmatory Episode B: At one point, not discussed 
above, while Judy was still thinking about her annoyance at 
the conceptual problems, the interviewer probes her views 
about both the real/ideal gulf and conceptual reasoning: “So 
do you think if you’re analyzing a real-world circuit, it’s 
important to know about the physical aspects of the circuit?” 
Judy responds, “Not very important.”  Crucially, her 
annoyance at the conceptual problems and the associated 
conceptual reasoning are still apparent during this part of the 
interview. The two-node model in figure 2 cannot explain 
this: a model in which she finds conceptual problems 
unproductive because they apply only to an idealized world 
does not explain why she finds conceptual reasoning 
unproductive even when used to analyze real-world circuits. 
 
Of course, an affect-free model different from ours in 
Fig. 2 might be able to explain Judy’s reasoning patterns 
throughout the interview. But given (i) the previous 
literature showing the role of affect on epistemological 
stances, and (ii) the in-your-face nature of the annoyance 
Judy displays towards conceptual problems during most of 
the interview, we have reason to take seriously models in 
which this affective state plays a role in stabilizing or 
destabilizing Judy’s epistemological stances. More 
specifically, we argue that in her cognition during this 
interview, annoyance mediates the connection she draws 
between conceptual problems and the gulf between 
real/ideal worlds. Our proposed three-node toy model 
(figure 3) represents this: annoyance mediates real/ideal 
gulf and conceptual-reasoning-useless nodes without those 
epistemological nodes connected directly. This new model, 
incorporating an affective state (annoyance) can explain 
Judy’s behaviors and reasoning:  
• Her annoyance at conceptual questions triggers her 
stance towards conceptual reasoning as useless and the 
real/ideal gulf (Patterns#2 and #3),  
• When she perceives herself as not engaged in 
conceptual reasoning but problem solving, her 
annoyance disappears and so does the idea of real/ideal 
gulf in those moments (even though the equations she is 
using encode idealizations) (Pattern #4). 
• Suppressing annoyance can suppress the activation of 
“conceptual reasoning useless” leading to the reversal 
of her epistemological stance (Episode A), and  
• Targeting Judy’s epistemology (by focusing on real 
circuits) without addressing Judy’s affect fails to 
suppress Judy’s view that conceptual reasoning is “not 
very important” (Episode B).   
 
 
FIGURE 3 
INCORPORATING AFFECT BETTER EXPLAINS THE CONTEXTUAL DYNAMICS 
OF JUDY’S EPISTEMOLOGICAL STANCES 
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
At first glance, Judy’s patterns of thought (discussed above) 
seem attributable in part to a robust belief that ideal circuits 
(addressed by conceptual problems on the homework) are 
very different from real circuits. We argued, however, that 
this “belief” is not a robust part of Judy’s reasoning across 
all contexts probed in the interview. Rather, an affective 
state—annoyance—is the bridge linking her views about the 
course’s conceptual problems and her epistemological 
stance about a real/ideal gulf. Including a context-dependent 
affective state (annoyance) in our model enabled us to 
explain: (i) the minimal or nonexistent role her 
epistemological stance (real/ideal gulf) plays in her thinking 
when she discusses or performs mathematical problem-
solving, and (ii) the disruption of her stance toward 
conceptual reasoning induced by an affectively positive 
experience. In this way, we illustrated how including affect 
in models of cognitive dynamics provides additional 
explanatory power. 
This analysis has instructional implications.  Given 
Judy’s stated belief that the conceptual problems are 
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annoying because of the real/ideal gulf, an obvious 
instructional strategy might be to directly address the 
real/ideal gulf by showing how idealizations approximate 
the real world, stressing the near-agreement of ideal 
predictions with real results. While we don’t disagree with 
that strategy, we don’t think it would be enough for students 
like Judy. Bringing about epistemological change for Judy 
(and students like her) might have more to do with setting 
her up to have affectively positive experiences, and less to 
do with eliciting, confronting, and replacing her problematic 
epistemological “beliefs.” Ultimately, though limited to one 
student in one interview, our analysis illustrates the 
importance and feasibility of incorporating affect into fine-
grained models of cognitive dynamics and how doing so can 
expand the toolbox of productive instructional responses.  
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